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THE LEGALITY UNDER THE ANTITRUST
LAWS OF WAGE STATISTICS
COMPILED BY PROFESSIONAL
ASSOCIATIONS
Lawrence R. Velvel*
As a service to their members, many professional associations compile
and distribute information on the salaries and fringe benefits paid to the
members' employees. Although these compilations of information can be
used for potentially anticompetitive purposes, they have been largely ig-
nored in the law and literature of antitrust. This lack of interest most likely
has stemmed from the very fact that the compilations were gathered for
professional institutions and individuals who were thought to be immune
from the antitrust laws under the alleged "learned professions" exemp-
tion-an exemption based on the rationale that professional activities did
not constitute trade or commerce within the meaning of the antitrust laws. '
However, now that the learned profession exemption has been eviscerated
by the Supreme Court's opinion in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,2 an un-
* Mr. Velvel is currently engaged in the private practice of antitrust law in Wash-
ington, D.C.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Oregon Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 336 (1952); Atlantic
Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932).
2. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). In Goldfarb, the minimum fee schedule of a county bar associ-
ation set a fixed and rigid price floor for legal services. The Supreme Court held that such a
price fixing arrangement was not immune from the antitrust laws under any exemption and
that bar associations may be held liable for activities which restrain competition. Of the
"learned profession" exemption, the Court stated:
In arguing that learned professions are not "trade or commerce" the County Bar
seeks a total exclusion from antitrust regulation .... We cannot find support for
the proposition that Congress intended any such sweeping exclusion. The nature of
an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act,
nor is the public-service aspect of professional practice controlling in determining
whether § 1 includes professions. Congress intended to strike as broadly as it could
in § I of the Sherman Act, and to read into it so wide an exemption as that urged
on us would be at odds with that purpose.
The language of § 1 of the Sherman Act, of course, contains no exception ....
And our cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presumption
against implicit exemptions. Indeed, our cases have specifically included the sale of
services within § 1. Whatever else it may be, the examination of a land title is a
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dercurrent of deep concern is emerging as to whether these salary compila-
tions are consonant with the Sherman Act.3
The salary and fringe benefit compilations in question can vary in de-
gree of specificity. They may contain certain statistical averages or ratios
relating to wages and benefits paid by some or all of the members of an
association. Medium, high, and low salaries may be charted. Gross and net
income attributable to classes of professional persons within each organi-
zation may be tabulated. Although efforts often made to withhold the
identification of particular members of an association, in some instances
members are identified, and in others they may be identifiable by infer-
ence.
Professional associations generally do not attempt to compel their mem-
bers to submit data for inclusion in the statistical compilations. They also
do not try to compel their members to adhere to averages, ratios or other
figures shown in the statistical compilations. Nevertheless, because of the
breadth of the antitrust laws and the fact that this is an uncharted area,
scrutiny of the compilations is beginning to occur, albeit quietly. The bulk
of this article will, therefore, examine the factors which are likely to be
critical in determining the legality of the compilations. Before turning to
these factors, however, the article will discuss the relevant economic
ramifications of these compilations.
I. THE PARADOX OF KNOWLEDGE
In assessing the legality of the distribution of salary and fringe benefit
information, it is noteworthy that this information suffers from the para-
service; the exchange of such a service for money is "commerce" in the most com-
mon usage of that word. It is no disparagement of the practice of law as a profes-
sion to acknowledge that it has this business aspect....
Id at 787-88 (citations omitted).
Nevertheless, the Court appeared to limit the scope of this ruling in certain instances,
stating in a footnote that:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a busi-
ness is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates
the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as
interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the
professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The public service
aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice,
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in another con-
text, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any situation other than the
one with which we are confronted today.
Id at 788-89 n.17.
3. The breadth of coverage of the Sherman Act is evident from § I of the Act: "Every
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the sev-
eral States . . . is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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dox which often attaches to the dissemination of information by trade as-
sociations.4 On one side of the paradox, in order for the competitive
process to work effectively, competitors must have access to vital economic
data, including the level of wages paid by other producers. Access to wage
data is particularly important when, as is true of organizations which pro-
duce professional services, wages are the most significant cost which must
be covered in computing the price of the ultimate product. Comparative
wage information helps a producer to know whether he is paying higher
salaries than necessary or, if he also receives other relevant data, to calcu-
late whether his total wage bill is too great in relation to the value of his
total output. Conversely, access to comparative wage information can en-
able a producer to recognize that he is paying insufficient wages and fringe
benefits to attract the quality of personnel necessary for a first rate per-
formance. Accordingly, compilations of wage information may serve to
foster competition in the marketplace by helping producers increase the
efficiency and quality of production.
On the other side of the paradox, the dissemination of comparative cost
data can have anticompetitive effects. Such effects are especially possible
when, as is true of statistics concerning the compensation paid to employ-
ees of professional organizations, the cost data concerns a factor of produc-
tion which is a major component of the total cost structure. Knowledge of
the prices which competitors pay for labor may cause general acceptance
of standardized wage rates, and acceptance of standardized prices for labor
will lessen natural competitive efforts to bid up or hold down the wage
level in accordance with forces of supply and demand. Such a situation
will, in turn, artificially inflate or reduce the price of the ultimate product
in relation to natural supply and demand. This result is even more likely
when, as often occurs in connection with professional services, the price of
the ultimate product is calculated by adding a standardized mark-up to the
costs of production.
For purposes of the antitrust laws, the paradox attaching to the compila-
tion and distribution of wage statistics is easily solved if members of a
professional association actually agree that they will continue to pay non-
union employees the wage rates shown in the statistics. In such a case, the
members of the association have entered an agreement to fix the price of
labor, and the law is likely to regard their agreement as illegal per se re-
gardless of any advantages to the competitive system which assertedly flow
4. See, e.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-85 (1925).
Compare the majority opinion with the dissenting opinions in American Column & Lumber
Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). For a discussion of these cases, see note 6 infra.
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from the spread of economic information. 5 The problem, however, is that
an explicit agreement to fix wage rates occurs in only the rare case. More
often, the existence of such an agreement must be inferred through an ex-
amination of the factors which are normally considered in assessing the
legality of programs under which trade associations disseminate economic
information. Throughout this examination, it will, of course, be necessary
to focus upon the overall purpose and effect of the compilations of wage
statistics.6
5. There is one factual context in which employers can all agree to pay the same
wages. Under the labor exemption to the antitrust laws, employers who belong to a single
multimember bargaining unit can all sign a collective bargaining agreement requiring that
each of them pay identical salaries. See UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 664-67 (1965).
Thus, if wage statistics are necessary to the process of negotiating such a collective bargain-
ing agreement, they could conceivably be immune from the antitrust laws under the labor
exemption. However, in connection with wage statistics of professional organizations, I am
presently aware of no actual situation which involves a collective bargaining agreement
signed by members of a multimember bargaining unit. Moreover, it appears that the labor
exemption would not realistically apply outside of this factual context. Id at 661-67. See
American Fed'n of Musicians v. Carroll, 391 U.S. 99 (1968); Local 189, Amalgamated Meat
Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., 381 U.S. 676 (1965); L. SULLIVAN,
ANTITRUST 724-31 (1977).
6. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921), a trade
association claimed benign purposes for its "Open Competition Plan," under which it gath-
ered and disseminated elaborate information regarding prices, production, and sales. The
Supreme Court disagreed, noting the elaborate nature of the information, the interpretations
and advice disseminated by an employee of the association, and the conduct of competitors
in raising prices. The Court inferred from these factors that the fundamental purpose of the
plan was to "procure 'harmonious' individual action among a large number of naturally
competing dealers with respect to the volume of production and prices .. " Id at 410-12.
In United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), the absence of a
trade association did not impede a finding of Sherman Act violation when competitors ex-
changed information on current prices charged on specific sales to identified customers.
Each competitor furnished this data to others on request, expecting to be provided with
reciprocal information when it is so desired. Because sales were very dependent upon price,
the industry was dominated by relatively few sellers, and knowledge of a competitor's price
usually caused a seller to match rather than beat the competitor's price, the price exchange
agreements were found to stabilize prices, thereby violating the Sherman Act. Id at 336-38.
In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the Chicago Board of
Trade adopted a "call" rule which, during particular times of the day, prohibited members
from purchasing or offering to purchase certain grain at any price other than the one pre-
vailing at the close of the "call" period. The Supreme Court held that this arrangement did
not violate the antitrust law. The Court stated that, in determining whether a particular
restraint merely regulated and lawfully promoted competition or unlawfully suppressed or
destroyed it, several factors should be considered, including: the peculiar nature of the busi-
ness, its condition before and after the imposition of the restraint, the nature and effect of
the restraint, the history of the restraint, the reasons for adopting it, and its purposes or the
results sought to be obtained. Id at 238. These factors are relevant "not because a good
intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation . . . but because knowledge of
intent may help the court to interpret facts and predict consequences." Id. In view of the
[Vol. 27:729
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II. FACTORS AFFECTING LEGALITY
A. History and Use of the Compilations
The reasons a professional organization undertook the compilations and
the use which members have made of them can have an important bearing
on their legality. 7 In many instances, their genesis stemmed from one or
both of two purposes which, although beneficent, are somewhat contradic-
tory. First, members of a professional association may have wanted to
know whether their costs of producing services were reasonable in compar-
ison with the costs of competitors. Second, members may have wanted reli-
able data which would enable them to make independent judgments on
whether they must pay higher salaries in order to attract and keep high
quality personnel. The more benign and pro-competitive the actual pur-
poses, the greater the chances the compilations will be held legal.
If the subsequent use and competitive effects of the compilations also
conform to beneficent purposes, this, too, will augur for legality. In this
regard, it appears that in our consistently inflationary economy, the statis-
tics have often been used in the past as a basis for increasing the salaries of
employees. In this connection, the statistics have been particularly useful
because professional organizations usually contain certain administrators
or partners who perforce resist salary increases for employees. Other ad-
ministrators or partners, who favor salary increases, have been able to cite
the statistics as grounds for increases in the compensation of their employ-
ees. To the extent that the statistics have served as grounds for salary in-
nature, scope, and effect of the "call" rule, the rule generally tended to foster competition
and was legal. Id 239-41.
In Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925), an elaborate infor-
mation exchange arrangement existed under which information was gathered and dissemi-
nated regarding product costs, actual sales prices in past transactions, stocks of merchandise
on hand, and transportation costs from a base point to points throughout the United States.
The competitors belonging to the flooring association also met and discussed this informa-
tion. The Supreme Court ruled that the government had failed to prove an agreement or
concerted action regarding prices, production, or attempts to restrain competition. Id at
586. The Court felt that the mere collection of the information by an association and its use
by members was not necessarily anticompetitive. The decision is obviously subject to criti-
cism. See, e.g., A. PHILLIPS, MARKET ORGANIZATION AND PERFORMANCE 138-60 (1962)
(criticizing the "uncritical, nonanalytical performance tests" used by the Court). For more
detailed discussion of the antitrust implications of the data dissemination practices used by
trade associations, see G. LAMB & C. SHIELDS, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE
54-73 (1971); Bodner, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership and
Participation, 54 A.B.A.J. 27 (1968).
7. See, e.g., Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925) (ex-
change of specific price information concerning specific customers approved, despite possi-
ble effects on prices when purpose of dissemination scheme was to prevent buyers from
defrauding sellers). See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 550 F.2d 115, 120-
27 (3d Cir.), affirmed, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (1978).
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creases, it becomes more difficult to infer that they are part of a price
fixing agreement designed to hold down wages. The only "agreement" of
which they inferentially could be a part is one to raise wages. Not surpris-
ingly, however, nobody has yet accused professional organizations of ille-
gally conspiring to raise the wages of their employees.
Nevertheless, even though the statistics have been used as a basis for
raising salaries in an inflationary economy in the past, it is possible that
existing conditions may cause the statistics to be used as a basis for keeping
down salaries in the future. Such use of the statistics would increase the
likelihood that an unlawful agreement to hold down wages could be in-
ferred.
In the last few years, a number of professional organizations have been
beset by financial difficulties or limitations, which threaten to continue.
Moreover, in certain professional fields there has been a glut of job appli-
cants, which also may continue. It cannot be expected that professional
organizations which are faced with a need for financial stringency or
which have an oversupply of qualified job applicants will be eager to pay
ever higher salaries indefinitely. Rather, at some point these organizations
are likely to seek to keep down their costs by holding the line on salaries.
Wage statistics will be useful in this quest, since the statistics will better
enable an organization to know whether it can obtain suitable personnel
even though it restrains the amount of salary which it pays. To the extent
that the statistics are utilized to restrain salaries, it is more possible to infer
that the purpose and use of the statistics is to facilitate an unlawful agree-
ment among competitors to limit the amount of wages they pay employees.
B. Discussions of the Statistics
On certain occasions, wage rates, including those revealed in the compi-
lations, may have been discussed by persons who hire or set the salaries of
workers employed by organizations which belong to a professional associ-
ation. As is true of the compilations themselves, the purpose of these dis-
cussions may be to obtain information which enables employers to make
better independent judgments on wage rates rather than to facilitate wage
fixing agreements among competitors. Yet, because discussions of price are
almost always viewed with suspicion, discussions of wages are probably as
dangerous to legality as are discussions of other kinds of prices. Moreover,
it is highly probable that the discussions of wages often occur in the spe-
cific context of a mutual desire to hold down the level of salaries. For
instance, when faced with the need to hire an employee, an administrator
in one organization may phone a counterpart elsewhere to swap informa-
tion on the amount each is paying particular kinds of employees. The goal
[Vol. 27:729
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of the phone call is to ascertain that the caller does not pay more than is
being paid elsewhere, a goal of which the party called is fully aware and
which he is only too happy to aid in order to decrease the possibility that
wage rates will rise. In these circumstances, there is a serious threat that
the exchange of information on wages, including the exchange accom-
plished by the compilations, is part of an illegal agreement to fix the price
of labor. 8
C. Structure of the Industry
An exchange of information in a highly oligopolized industry is more
suspect than a similar exchange in a competitive industry. 9 Professional
associations are usually involved in the production of services rather than
products, and service industries are alniost never highly concentrated. Be-
cause of this atomistic structure, there usually is competition in bidding for
the services of their employees. Indeed, the competitive bidding is some-
times increased because members of other industries may also be bidding
for the same kind of employees. Thus, the competitive nature of profes-
sional service industries would argue for the legality of wage compilations.
There may, however, be a complication to this analysis. Though each
professional service industry contains numerous competitors, as a practical
matter, it is often true that the competitors in such an industry can be
roughly divided into two groups, one composed of highly prestigious or
large organizations which pay high levels of compensation, and the other
composed of smaller or less prestigious organizations which pay lesser
amounts of compensation. To the extent that the first of these groups is
relatively small and can realistically be regarded as a submarket, this sub-
market may be somewhat oligopolistic, whereas the submarket represented
by the second and larger group of organizations remains unconcentrated
and competitive. The partially oligopolistic nature of the first group of or-
ganizations would argue against the legality of wage statistics, while the
atomistic nature of the second group would argue for their legality. Ironi-
cally, however, the behavior displayed by each group may lead to the op-
posite result because the relatively small number of large and prestigious
8. If discussions of wages take place at meetings of professional associations, and the
discussions later lead to a determination that the law was violated, then not only the mem-
bers of the association but the association itself may be held liable. Moreover, if there are no
discussions of wages at trade association meetings, but wage statistics are found illegal for
some other reason, the association may still be found to have acted illegally if its purpose in
sponsoring or compiling the statistics was to facilitate the violation or if it was aware that the
violation was a likely consequence of the statistics.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 342-43 (1969)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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organizations often lead the way to higher salary levels-which argues for
the legality of the statistics. On the other hand, the submarket composed of
the large number of smaller and less prestigious organizations may have a
particularly strong interest in using the statistics to hold down wage
levels-which argues against the validity of the statistics.
D. Consonance with Supply and Demand
If the trend of wages has conformed to expectations derived from the
natural forces of supply and demand, the legality of the compilations is
strengthened.' 0 To assess the correspondence between the trend of wages
and the forces of supply and demand, it can be useful to compare the wage
rates paid by members of a professional organization with the rates paid
by nonmembers who are part of the same industry. If the wages paid by
nonmembers have risen to a far greater extent than those paid by mem-
bers, a strong inference is created that the members have used the wage
compilations as a device for implementing an agreement to hold down sal-
aries.
Even if the wages paid by members of an association have risen to a
considerable extent, it is still possible that they might have risen faster or
further if wage information had not been exchanged. I However, because
members of professional associations usually belong to service industries
which are atomistic and competitive, this argument possesses less strength
here than it might have in the context of some concentrated industries.
E. Form of the Statistics
It is generally believed that economic data circulated by trade associa-
tions should be in the form of aggregate or average statistics rather than
precise figures concerning individually identifiable companies or transac-
tions. 12 Moreover, when the economic data consists of prices, it should
relate to the price level of prior transactions, not current or future prices.13
To the extent that wage statistics conform to these norms, the legality of
the statistics is aided.
10. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 567-68, 582-85
(1925).
11. See discussion of United States v. Container Corp. of America, supra note 6.
12. See M. MCARTHUR, ASSOCIATIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 28, 39-41 (1976);
Address by J. Wallace before the American Institute of Industrial Engineers, Management
Division Conference, Greensboro, North Carolina (March 5, 1976); Competitive In-
terchanges of Price, Cost, Production and Technological Information-How To Do It With-
out Violating The Antitrust Laws; Association of Legal Administrators, Antitrust Guide for
Members of the Association of Legal Administrators (April 1977) (available from ALA). See
also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
13. See generally note 12 supra and authorities cited therein.
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In certain respects, however, wage statistics compiled by professional as-
sociations may not conform to these standards. At times, the names of spe-
cific member organizations are appended to statistics concerning the wages
and fringe benefits paid by those particular groups. This breaches the
norm against revealing the statistics of identifiable organizations. 4 Also,
by their very nature, organizations which belong to professional associa-
tions have certain jobs which are filled by only one or two persons. When
wage compilations contain statistics about these jobs, and the name of each
member organization is appended to its own statistics, one is no longer
dealing in average price figures for unidentified transactions. In this situa-
tion, both the specific wages paid as well as the persons to whom they are
paid can be identified. Finally, professional associations often attempt to
produce statistics for the current economic or calendar year rather than
prior years. Since wage levels are set for a year at a time, statistics for the
current year inevitably reveal not merely the salaries which have been paid
earlier in the year, but also the salaries which will be paid during the re-
mainder of the year. This, of course, violates the rule against revealing
future prices.
Since the wage statistics may depart from the usual norms, the question
arises as to whether these departures are justifiable. Justification may exist
if the statistics have been used procompetitively.15 The identification of
particular member organizations and the identification of the compensa-
tion paid to particular individuals can indeed have procompetitive effects
if the member organizations use these statistics to emulate competitors
with whom they feel a strong rivalry or competitors who have achieved a
high level of status or quality. In such cases, identification of specific orga-
nizations and individuals gives others a competitive target.
It is possible, however, to argue that even though the statistics can be
used in a procompetitive manner, departures from the norms should not be
allowed since the statistics could have been drawn up without such depar-
tures. For instance, the identification of specific organizations could be
eliminated, the statistics could be confined to prior years so that there
would be no identification of the salary levels which will be paid during
the future part of the current year, and the statistics concerning identifiable
individuals could be omitted. These methods of compilation may consti-
tute a less restrictive alternative because arguably they reduce the likeli-
hood that competitors will reach implicit agreement or uniformity on
wages.
14. But see note 7 supra and cases cited therein.
15. See discussion of Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, supra note 6.
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On the other hand, unless wage compilations are first shown to have
some actual anticompetitive purpose or effect, it is questionable whether
professional associations should be forced to alter their present statistical
techniques. For not only does the current statistical format provide a basis
for procompetitive emulation of successful rivals, but, in accordance with
economic and business precepts, the present format enables professional
organizations to plan for the future on the basis of the most recent and
reasonably detailed economic information. 16
F Use of an Independent Third Party to Compile the Statistics
It is often thought that the legality of a statistical program will be en-
hanced if the statistics are compiled by an independent third party rather
than the trade association itself.' 7 For this reason, statistics on the wages
paid by members of professional associations are sometimes compiled by
independent accounting firms. Nevertheless, many professional associa-
tions continue to compile their own statistics.
Because the use of an independent third party to compile statistics might
prove helpful in persuading a court that wage compilations are legal, it
may be wise to utilize a third person even though this may not be strictly
necessary under a purely objective analysis of antitrust law. Whether it is
necessary under a purely objective analysis depends upon how much of the
raw data received by the person who compiles the wage statistics consists
of information which should not be distributed to association members,
lest an unlawful pricing agreement be facilitated, and which must, there-
fore, be converted into a more innocuous form, such as average figures,
before the statistics are transmitted to members. When raw data of this
type is received, an independent third person is desirable to decrease the
possibility that the raw information will fall into the wrong hands, either
inadvertently or by design.
In this regard, however, there may be less need to use an independent
third party to compile wage statistics than to compile other kinds of price
statistics. As stated previously, it may be permissible for wage statistics to
give more detail than is allowed for other kinds of price figures as long as
the effects are procompetitive. It is possible, therefore, that wage statistics
can breach ordinary norms by showing wages paid by particular member
organizations, wages paid to identifiable individuals, and wages to be paid
16. If the current statistical format is one of several factors which lead to a violation of
the law, the violation may be curable by eliminating the other factors, without altering the
statistical methods. If so, and if the present statistical methods have some competitive bene-
fits, the existing methods should be permitted to continue.
17. See M. MCARTHUR, supra note 12, at 43.
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during the future part of the year. This being so, there is less need for
secrecy of the underlying raw data, since the raw data consists of the kind
of details which can be included in the statistics. And the less the need for
secrecy of the raw data, the less the need for an independent third party to
compile the statistics. 18
Nevertheless, it is also quite possible that the party who compiles the
statistics will receive at least some raw wage data which should not be
transferred among competitors, such as the salaries of individuals whose
identities need not be ascertainable from wage statistics. When this oc-
curs-and it often will-an objective analysis may require the use of an
independent third party.
Another factor mitigating against the need for using a third party is the
high cost involved. If a professional association is sufficiently penurious
that it cannot afford this cost, it is arguable that the association itself
should be permitted to compile the statistics, since the competitive market-
place may function better with wage statistics compiled by the association
than with no statistics at all. There is, however, one obstacle to acceptance
of this argument: if the statistics are truly helpful to the members of an
association, the members, if they are sufficiently affluent, could simply pay
more money to the association in order to cover the cost of having an in-
dependent person compile the statistics.
G Availability of the Statistics to Employees
In many instances, statistics on wages and fringe benefits are not re-
vealed to the employees whose levels of compensation are the subject of
the figures. On the contrary, the statistics often are scrupulously, even re-
ligiously, withheld from the employees. This secrecy poses a major stum-
bling block to legality.
In order to work effectively, the competitive process requires that eco-
nomic information be available to those who are engaged in the given eco-
nomic activity. Clearly, this need for information is not limited only to
those on one side of a market, but applies to those on both sides. For in-
stance, for the competitive process to function with maximum efficiency,
statistical information on the price of a product cannot be revealed to sell-
ers and withheld from buyers or vice versa. Rather, it must be given to
buyers and sellers alike.' 9 This precept is no less true when the price in-
18. Of course, although secrecy of the raw data may not be required by the antitrust
laws, secrecy may still be desired by the association's members because they may regard the
raw data as confidential business information.
19. In Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936), the Supreme Court
indicated that the dissemination of information to both sides of the market normally aids
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volved is the price of labor rather than the price of a product.
In keeping wage compilations secret from employees, professional as-
sociations and their members may be gaining a significant anticompetitive
advantage which serves their own ends rather than the ends of a competi-
tive marketplace. Each member organization will learn from the statistics
the level of salaries which its employees might command elsewhere, but
the employees themselves will not have the same access to that informa-
tion. The employees' lack of information can-and often does-result in
their acceptance of salaries which are beneath the true value of their serv-
ices in the marketplace. This situation certainly benefits the employer, but
distorts the allocation of labor resources and is unfair to employees who
could earn more by going elsewhere. These results are especially dis-
turbing when nonmonetary considerations play a relatively small role in
an employee's decision to remain with an employer, such as the common
situation in which the price paid to labor is the vital factor in an em-
ployee's decision.
It must be recognized, of course, that the failure to reveal the statistics to
employees does not mean that the employees' side of the market is wholly
bereft of relevant information. There may be an informal grapevine
through which employees obtain some information on salaries paid else-
where. But information from the grapevine, which is equally available to
employers, is usually incomplete and vague. It does not begin to equal or
give the same advantage as formal wage statistics.
In cases in which employment agencies are active in the marketplace,
the agencies provide another source of wage information for the employ-
ees' side of the market. The agencies keep abreast of the generally prevail-
ing levels of wages and also of the specific wage rates being paid by
individual employers. Indeed, the amount of market knowledge possessed
by the agencies can greatly exceed the amount known to individual em-
ployers; and to some extent, compilations of wage statistics may represent
an effort to equalize this imbalance so that an employer will not be at a
serious disadvantage when negotiating with agencies over the salary which
the employer should be offering for particular jobs.
Even when they are active, however, the existence of employment agen-
cies is not a satisfactory answer to a failure to make wage statistics avail-
able to employees. Because the agencies are seeking to further their own
commerce, whereas the restriction of the information to one side of the market is undesir-
able. Id at 598-99. The Court thus enjoined sugar refiners from gathering and disseminat-
ing, to themselves alone, certain statistical information which was not readily, fully, and
fairly available to the purchasing trade. Id at 602-05. See also discussion of Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, supra note 6.
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financial interests, they do not necessarily make full and complete infor-
mation available to prospective employees who use their services. More-
over, some prospective workers do not wish to use their services, and
should not be forced to do so in order to obtain marketplace information.
Thus, the existence of the grapevine and employment agencies will not
validate the practice of withholding wage statistics from employees and
will not eliminate the possibility of a violation of the antitrust laws. To
eliminate this possibility, it would clearly be advantageous to professional
associations to make the wage compilations available to their employees to
equalize the knowledge possessed by the other side of the market. More-
over, while the thought may be somewhat boggling at first glance, it would
also be advantageous for the associations to make the statistics available
not just to existing employees, but also to potential employees. No less
than existing employees, applicants, too, are part of the other side of the
employment market. They also need access to wage information in order
to fully assess their value in the marketplace and to make employment
decisions. Such an open availability of wage statistics would generally tend
to foster competition for professional services.
H. Voluntary Particpation by Members and by Nonmember Competitors
Members of a professional association should-and normally do-have
a free choice as to whether they wish to cooperate with a statistical pro-
gram by submitting wage and fringe benefit data. If members are forced to
submit such data upon pain of suffering punishment, such as a fine or
expulsion from the association, the case for the legality of the wage compi-
lations is harmed. On the other hand, it appears reasonable to argue that a
member organization can be denied access to the wage compilations if it
freely chooses not to submit the essential data. If members could obtain
the compilations without submitting their own wage data, there would
likely be a significant decrease in the number of members who provide
information and in the value of the compilations.
Competitors who are not members of a professional association should
also be permitted to participate in the association's wage compilations, al-
though the nonmembers who choose to participate can be required to pay
their fair share of the costs. 20 Allowing nonmembers to participate by sub-
mitting data and receiving the compilations will serve the effective work-
ing of the competitive process, since nonmember competitors have as
much need as members for vital economic information. Conversely, a re-
20. See M. MCARTHUR, supra note 12, at 41.
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fusal to permit participation by nonmembers will serve only the business
ends of the members and not the efficient working of the marketplace.
III. CONCLUSION
Wage statistics compiled by professional associations are often regarded
as an invaluable competitive tool by members of these associations. How-
ever, the legality of the statistics is presently an uncharted area of antitrust
law and, except for unusual situations in which competitors may have ex-
plicitly agreed to use the statistics as a tool for stablizing wages, it is not
possible to draw any bright line as to when the statistics will or will not be
lawful. Rather, their legality will depend upon the particular facts of each
given situation, with heavy emphasis being placed upon the typical anti-
trust considerations relating to purpose and effect. Thus, the reasons that
wage compilations were initiated, whether they have been used in a
procompetitive or anticompetitive way, whether the methods of drawing
them up are defensible, whether they have contributed to results which are
in harmony with natural marketplace forces, and whether participation in
a wage statistics program is voluntary and open to all competitors, will be
relevant questions in any given factual situation.
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